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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction under section 509(b)(1)(F) of the
Clean Water Act (“CWA”), 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(F) (2012), to
review the final federal National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (“NPDES”) permit issued to EnerProg, L.L.C. (“EnerProg”)
for discharges associated with the continued operation of the
Moutard Electric Generating Station (“MEGS”) located in Fossil,
Progress. On April 1, 2017, pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 124.19(a)
(2017), Petitioners EnerProg and Fossil Creek Watchers, Inc.,
(“FCW”) timely filed for review of the permit with the
Environmental Appeals Board (“EAB”) of the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”). Record (“R.”) at 6. After
the EAB issued an order denying review, EnerProg and FCW
timely petitioned this Court for review. Id. 2.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I.

Is the EPA required to include conditions requiring closure
and remediation of the ash pond as provided by the State of
Progress in the CWA section 401 certification without
regard to their consistency with section 401(d) of the CWA?
And if so, do the conditions constitute appropriate
requirements of state law as required by section 401(d)?

II.

Does the April 25, 2017, EPA temporary stay notice
effectively require the postponement of certain compliance
deadlines for the 2015 Final Effluent Limitation Guidelines
for the Steam Electric Power Generating Industry, given
that EPA reasonably concluded under section 705 of the
Administrative Procedure Act that justice so requires the
postponement of the deadlines in light of pending judicial
review in the Fifth Circuit?

III.

Under section 402 of the CWA, did EPA Region XII properly
determine it could rely on Best Professional Judgment to
require zero discharge of coal ash transport wastes given
that EnerProg’s MEGS is subject to properly promulgated
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Steam Electric Power Generating Point Source Category
Effluent Limitation Guidelines?
IV.

Does the MEGS ash pond treatment system classify as a
“waste treatment system” under 40 C.F.R. § 122.2, given
the legal effect of Note 1, thereby excluding it from the
jurisdictional reach of the CWA and NPDES permitting
requirements for internal Outfall 008 and Outfall 009?

V.

Does dewatering and capping the MEGS ash pond trigger
section 404 of the CWA requiring EnerProg to obtain a fill
permit when fill material is not being placed into a water of
the United States?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On April 1, 2017, EnerProg and FCW petitioned EAB for
review of the NPDES Permit No. PG000123 (“NPDES Permit”),
requesting on numerous grounds that the permit be remanded to
EPA Region XII for further consideration. R. at 6. Both petitions
were timely filed in accordance with EAB’s filing deadline
extension. Id. On January 18, 2017, EPA Region XII issued the
NPDES Permit to EnerProg. Id. at 6. The NPDES Permit
authorizes EnerProg to continue water pollution discharges
associated with the continued operation of the MEGS. Id.
EnerProg objected to the permits’s inclusion of conditions set
in the CWA section 401 certification issued by the State of
Progress. Id. at 2. Further, EnerProg objected to the November 1,
2018, deadlines for compliance with zero discharge requirements
for coal ash transport waters as contemplated by a notice issued by
EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt on April 25, 2017 (“Temporary
Stay Notice”). Id. Lastly, EnerProg challenged the permit writer’s
reliance on Best Professional Judgment (“BPJ”) as a ground for
requiring implementation of dry handling of bottom ash and fly ash
wastes to achieve the zero discharge requirements. Id. On the
other hand, the FCW argued that internal discharges of fly ash and
bottom ash from Outfall 008 into the MEGS coal ash pond
treatment system (“MEGS Pond”) required an NPDES permit.

3
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FCW also asserted that the closure and capping required a section
404 permit. Id. at 12–13.
The EAB, in affirming the issuance of the NPDES Permit to
EnerProg, subsequently denied EnerProg’s and FCW’s petition for
review and all of the arguments raised. Id. at 2, 10–13. EnerProg
and FCW then timely petitioned this Court for judicial review of
the final decision of the EAB. Id. at 2.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The MEGS is a coal-fired steam electric power plant located in
Fossil, Progress. Id. at 6. Because it is a steam electric power
generating point source, MEGS is subject to EPA’s effluent
limitation guidelines (“ELGs”). Id. at 9. MEGS utilizes water
resources from Moutard Reservoir to operate its facility, mainly to
operate the closed-cycle cooling system. Id. at 7. Water is also
withdrawn from the Moutard Reservoir to make up for evaporative
losses from the cooling tower, for boiler water, and to transport fly
ash and bottom ash. Id.
To remove ash build up, MEGS maintains a wet fly ash and
bottom ash handling and waste treatment system in order to
remove coal by-products that build up in the plant’s boiler and
furnace systems during steam generation. To remove the coal ash,
MEGS sluices the coal combustion residuals through water pipes,
discharging the fly ash and bottom ash transport water into the
MEGS Pond via Internal Outfall 008. Id. There the transport
water undergoes treatment by sedimentation before being
discharged to the Moutard Reservoir via Outfall 002. Id. The
MEGS Pond was created in June 1978 by damming the then freeflowing upper reach of Fossil Creek, which does not discharge to
the reservoir, but is a perennial tributary to the Progress River, a
navigable-in-fact interstate body of water. Id.
In response to Progress’ Clean Air Act Implementation Plan,
EnerProg installed a Flue Gas Desulfurization (“FGD”) system. Id.
The FGD blowdown generates a flow of approximately 125 million
gallons of water per day and was designed to discharge into the
MEGS Pond via Outfall 009. Id. However, in February 2015
EnerProg installed a vapor compression evaporator (“VCE”) to
treat the FGD blowdown. The VCE evaporates the majority of the
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water waste produced from the FGD, typically eliminating the
majority of waste water blowdown from the FGD that discharges
into the MEGS Pond via Outfall 009. Id. The MEGS plant converts
the rest of the waste stream for use in other MEGS processes. Id.
Currently, MEGS is also constructing a new FGD settling basin.
Id. at 10. The waste from the basin will be treated by VCE. Id. In
case of the severe storms, overflow from the basin may be routed
to Outfall 002. Id.
The facility operates five outfalls. Id. Outfall 001 is a cooling
tower system that directly discharges to Moutard Reservoir. Id.
Outfall 002 is an ash pond treatment system that also discharges
directly to Moutard Reservoir. Id. at 7–8. Internal Outfall 008 is a
fly ash and bottom ash transport water system which discharges
directly to the MEGS Pond. Id. at 8. Internal Outfall 009 is the
discharge from the FGD blowdown treatment system to the MEGS
Pond. Id. Lastly, Outfall 002A will contain the discharge from the
new lined retention basin, upon completion of construction. Id. at
8.
To continue operation of the MEGS, EnerProg applied for a
renewal of its NPDES Permit. Id. at 7. As a condition for state
certification under section 401 of CWA, the State of Progress
requires EnerProg to comply with the Progress Coal Ash Cleanup
Act (“CACA”)—a state law purported to prevent the hazards
associated with the failures of ash treatment pond containment
systems. The law requires the “assessment, closure, and
remediation of substandard coal ash disposal facilities in the State
of Progress.” Id. at 8–9. To comply with CACA, EnerProg must: (1)
terminate use of the MEGS Pond by November 1, 2018, (2) dewater
the ash pond by September 1, 2019, and (3) cap the remaining coal
combustion residuals by September 1, 2020. Id. As a result, the
MEGS will be required to build a new retention basin to reroute all
waste streams currently discharged into the MEGS Pond. Id. at 9.
Upon completion, the new lined retention basin will receive MEGS
wastewater discharge via Outfall 002A. Id. at 8.
Pursuant to the 2015 revised ELGs for the Steam Electric
Power Generating Point Source Category (“2015 ELGs Rule”), Best
Available Technology (“BAT”) for toxic discharges associated with
bottom ash and fly ash is zero discharge, based on the available
technology of dry handling of these wastes. Id. at 9. The discharge
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from the MEGS Pond contains elevated levels of arsenic, mercury,
and selenium. It was therefore determined by the permit writer
that independent of the 2015 ELGs Rule, the NPDES Permit must
contain limits for toxic pollutants present in the discharge. Id.
Accordingly, the permit writer—using his BPJ—determined that
zero discharge of ash handling wastes by November 1, 2018,
constitutes BAT for discharges associated with coal ash wastes. Id.
The permit writer reasoned that dry handling of bottom ash and
fly ash has been in use in the industry and that the MEGS is
sufficiently profitable to adopt the dry handling of these wastes
with no more than a twelve cents per month increase in the
average consumer’s electric bill. Id.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Challenges to EPA actions under section 509(b) of the CWA,
33 U.S.C. § 1369(b), are reviewed under the extremely deferential
arbitrary and capricious standard. See Akiak Native Cmty. v. EPA,
625 F.3d 1162, 1165 (9th Cir. 2010). Under the APA a court must
set aside agency action only if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A) (2012). Review under this standard “is narrow and a
court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.” Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
43 (1983). Agency action is arbitrary and capricious only where an
agency has “entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the
problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter
to the evidence . . . , or is so implausible that it could not be
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.”
Id.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
EnerProg takes issue with the final NPDES Permit as issued
by EPA Region XII and affirmed by the EAB. First, EnerProg takes
issue with the NPDES Permit’s inclusion of certain requirements
for the closure of its MEGS Pond mandated by the State of Progress
as conditions to the state certification under section 401(d), 33
U.S.C. § 1341(d) (2012). EPA is required to include in an NPDES
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permit only those conditions which are consistent with the CWA.
Here, the coal ash pond closure and remediation conditions set by
the State of Progress are not appropriate requirements of state law
and are outside of the scope of section 401(d), 33 U.S.C. §1341(d),
because they are not based on achieving state water quality
standards established under section 303 of the CWA, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1313 (2012).
Second, EnerProg takes issue with the EAB’s refusal to
postpone the NPDES Permit’s November 1, 2018, compliance
deadlines for achieving zero discharge of coal ash transport waters
as contemplated by the April 25, 2017, Temporary Stay Notice. The
Temporary Stay Notice issued by EPA pursuant to section 705 of
the APA, effectively postpones the November 1, 2018, deadlines for
achieving zero discharge of coal ash transport waters for the 2015
ELGs Rule because it comports with the APA. EPA reasonably
concluded that: (1) justice so requires the postponement of the
compliance deadlines in light of pending judicial review in the Fifth
Circuit; (2) compliance deadlines that have not passed are within
the meaning of “effective date”; and (3) section 705 temporary stays
do not require notice and comment rulemaking.
Lastly, EnerProg takes issue with EPA Region XII’s reliance
on BPJ for requiring zero discharge of coal ash transport waters by
November 1, 2018, because the CWA does not require BPJ
determinations where a nationwide ELG applies. The 2015 ELGs
Rule has the full force and effect of law and thus reliance on BPJ
has a negative practical effect on EnerProg’s NPDES Permit
requirements. Even if the 2015 ELGs Rule was eliminated or
vacated, reliance on BPJ is still improper since the 1982 ELGs
regulate arsenic, mercury, and selenium. Assuming BPJ applies,
EPA Region XII failed to consider if BAT effluent limitations was
economically achievable.
On the other hand, EPA Region XII and the EAB properly
determined that no effluent limitations are required for Internal
Outfall 008 as it does not discharge into a “water of the United
States.” The MEGS Pond is not a “water of the United States,” as
that term is defined in 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (2017), because it is a
waste treatment system and is therefore not subject to NPDES
permitting requirements. Although the exclusion was initially
limited to only manmade bodies of water which were neither
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originally created in waters of the United States nor resulted from
impoundment of waters of the United States, the EPA properly
suspended the qualifying sentence of the exclusion.
Additionally, EPA Region XII and the EAB properly
determined that the coal ash pond closure and capping plan does
not require a permit under section 404 of the CWA, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1344 (2012). The jurisdictional definition of “waters of the United
States” is almost identical for section 402 and section 404
permitting. Under both the EPA’s and the Army Corps of
Engineers’ regulations for administering the section 404 program,
the coal ash pond is not a “water of the United States,” and an
exemption for waste treatment systems apply. However, even if the
MEGS Pond is found to be a “water of the United States,” EPA is
not the proper agency to issue a section 404 permit as the Secretary
of the Army is tasked with that responsibility.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE FINAL NPDES PERMIT IMPROPERLY
INCLUDED CONDITIONS SET BY THE STATE
OF PROGRESS IN THE CWA SECTION 401
CERTIFICATION.

Section 401(a)(1) of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. §1341(a)(1), requires
an applicant for a federal license or permit, whose activity may
result in a discharge into navigable waters, to obtain a certification
from the state in which the discharge originates. The purpose of
the certification is to ensure that the applicant’s discharge
complies with sections 301, 302, 303, 306, and 307, which congress
enumerated in section 401(a). See 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a). Conditions
included by the state in the certificate become conditions on the
federal license or permit, so long as they are “necessary to assure”
compliance with limitations enumerated in the code and with “any
other appropriate requirement of State law.” Id. § 1341(d)
(emphasis added). This Court reviews EPA’s action under the
arbitrary and capricious standard. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); Am.
Wildlands v. Browner, 260 F.3d 1192, 1196 (10th Cir. 2011).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol9/iss1/4

8

2018]

RUNNER UP – BEST BRIEF

113

A. The EPA Must Verify That the Conditions Set by the
State of Progress for EnerProg to Obtain
Certification are Consistent With CWA Section
401(d) Before Those Conditions are Incorporated in
an NPDES Permit.
The EPA is Congressionally authorized to administer the
CWA. Am. Rivers, Inc. v. FERC., 129 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 1997).
Furthermore, several courts have ruled that the EPA has the
discretion to review state water standards to verify they comply
with the CWA. Defs. of Wildlife v. EPA, 415 F.3d 1121, 1127 (10th
Cir. 2005) (holding that the EPA correctly found ambiguous state
regulation adopted under state’s water quality act did not apply,
and that the regulation was contrary to the CWA); Nw. Envtl.
Advocates v. EPA, 855 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1211 (D. Or. 2012) (noting
that the EPA had a duty to review the State of Oregon’s water
quality standards to verify it met CWA’s requirements); Nat. Res.
Def. Council v. EPA, 806 F. Supp. 1263, 1273 (E.D. Va. 1992)
(holding the EPA sufficiently reviewed state standards under
statutory scheme of the CWA). Agency decisions should not be
disturbed or substituted by judges who, unlike agency
administrators, have no duty or expertise with regard to the
statute. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 843–45 (1984).
Here, the EAB mistakenly cited Am. Rivers, Inc. in proposing
that the EPA does not have the authority to review the certification
requirements set by the State of Progress. See Am. Rivers, Inc., 129
F.3d at 107. However, the court in Am. Rivers, Inc. only held that
the Federal Energy Regulation Commission (“FERC”) does not
have the discretion to review a state’s certification requirements.
Id. (“[T]he [FERC] is not Congressionally authorized to administer
the CWA . . .‘[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided in this
chapter, the Administrator of the [EPA] shall administer this
chapter.’”).
Moreover, the laws of Progress do not provide for review of
such certifications in the state’s courts. Because there is no
procedure available under the laws of Progress for EnerProg to
obtain judicial review of the state certification conditions,
EnerProg would be substantially prejudiced. Cf. 40 C.F.R.

9
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§ 124.55(e) (2017). Allowing review where a court does not have
procedures available would lead to efficiency in the judicial system,
certainty, and fairness.
B. The Ash Pond Closure and Remediation Conditions
are Not “Appropriate Requirements of State Law” as
Required by Section 401(d) of The CWA Because the
CACA Requirements are Not Based on Achieving
State Water Quality Standards Established Under
CWA Section 303.
Although section 401(d) of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1341(d),
authorizes the state to place restrictions on a permit applicant’s
activity, that authority is limited. PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Cty. v.
Washington Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 712, (1994). The state
can only certify that the project conforms with limitations
prescribed in the CWA. Id. One such limitation is prescribed in
section 303 of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (2012). See 33 U.S.C.
§ 1341(a), (d) (limitation is incorporated into section 401(d) because
it is expressly enumerated in section 401(a)). Accordingly, states
may condition an applicant’s section 401(d) certification on their
compliance with section 303.
Section 303 grants states the authority, subject to federal
approval, to establish water quality standards for all intrastate
waters. PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Cty., 511 U.S. at 700. Section 303(c)
defines “water quality standard” as: (1) “the designated uses of the
navigable waters involved,” and (2) “the water quality criteria for
such waters based upon such uses.” 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A).
Here, the EAB erred when it affirmed the certification
conditions set by the State of Progress because the coal ash pond
remediation and closure requirements pursuant to CACA are
outside the scope of section 303. The authority of the State of
Progress under section 401 is limited to the extent the permit
complies with water quality standards under section 303. See 33
U.S.C. § 1341(a), (d). The CACA conditions which require
EnerProg to terminate use of the MEGS Pond by November 1,
2018, dewater the pond by September 1, 2019, and cap the
remaining coal combustion residuals by September 1, 2020, cannot
be applied under section 401(d) independently of section 303
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because they do not concern water quality standards. This is
evident in the statute, as the CACA does not designate the use of
the navigable waters, nor does it set water quality criteria for such
waters based upon such uses. Instead, CACA is a state-enacted law
that requires assessment closure, and remediation of substandard
coal ash disposal facilities in the State of Progress in order to
prevent public hazards. Hence, these state law requirements are
not appropriate because they are not based on achieving water
quality standards as established under CWA section 303, and is
thus beyond the scope of section 401(d).
II.

THE APRIL 25, 2017, TEMPORARY STAY
NOTICE EFFECTIVELY POSTPONES THE
NOVEMBER
1,
2018,
DEADLINES
FOR
ACHIEVING ZERO DISCHARGE OF COAL ASH
TRANSPORT WATERS FOR THE 2015 ELGS
RULE BECAUSE IT IS A LAWFUL AND
REASONABLE EXERCISE OF THE EPA’S
DISCRETION UNDER SECTION 705 OF THE
APA.

APA section 705, broadly authorizes an agency to “postpone
the effective date of action taken by it, pending judicial review,”
where the agency finds that “justice so requires.” 5 U.S.C. 705
(2012). The April 25, 2017, Temporary Stay Notice is a valid and
reasonable exercise of EPA’s authority under the APA because it
comports with section 705, compliance dates are within the
meaning of “effective date,” and notice and comment is not
required when issuing a section 705 temporary stay. This Court
reviews EPA’s decision on the deferential arbitrary and capricious
standard. Sierra Club v. Jackson, 833 F. Supp. 2d 11, 18 (D.C.C.
2012).
A. The Temporary Stay Notice Comports with APA
Section 705 Because EPA Reasonably Concluded
that Justice So Requires the Postponement of
Certain 2015 ELGs Rule Compliance Deadlines in
Light of Pending Judicial Review in the Fifth
Circuit.

11
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APA section 705, imposes only two conditions on an agency’s
authority to stay the effectiveness of a rule: (1) the agency must
find that “justice so requires;” and (2) the rule stayed must be
“pending judicial review.” 5 U.S.C. § 705. Here, EPA Administrator
Scott Pruitt did not violate section 705 in issuing the April 25,
2017, Temporary Stay Notice of certain compliance deadlines in
the final 2015 ELGs Rule because the statute places broad
authority on EPA to provide equitable relief pending judicial
review when it finds that justice so requires. Id.
On April 25, 2017, EPA published the Temporary Stay Notice1
reasoning that pursuant to APA section 705 justice so requires it
to postpone certain not yet effective compliance dates of the 2015
ELGs Rule to preserve the status quo while litigation is pending.
Postponement of Certain Compliance Dates for Effluent
Limitations Guidelines and Standards for the Steam Electric
Power Generating Point Source Category, 82 Fed. Reg. 19,005
(Apr. 25, 2017) (temporary stay notice). Particularly, the
Temporary Stay Notice postpones compliance deadlines for
achieving zero discharge of fly ash and bottom ash transport water.
Id.
1. EPA reasonably concluded that “justice so requires” a stay
of compliance deadlines.
Section 705 does not impose any specific standard for issuance
of administrative stays, other than when “justice so requires” it. 5
U.S.C. § 705. Because section 705 does not specify
what factors an agency must consider in determining whether
“justice so requires” a stay, EPA is free to follow its own; and
“absent extraordinary circumstances, it is improper for a reviewing
court to prescribe the procedural format an agency must follow.”
Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435
U.S. 519, 541 (1978). This is because “[b]eyond the APA’s minimum
requirements, courts lack authority to impose upon [an] agency its
1 The April 25, 2017, Temporary Stay Notice is being challenged in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia. Complaint, Clean Water Action, et al. v. Pruitt, No. 17817 (D.D.C. May 3, 2017), ECF Doc. No. 1.
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own notion of which procedures are best.” Perez v. Mortg. Bankers
Ass’n, 135 S.Ct. 1199, 1207 (2015).
Despite section 705’s clear language, one district court held
that the standard for a section 705 stay at the agency level is “the
same as the standard for a stay at the judicial level: each is
governed by the four-part preliminary injunction test.” Sierra
Club, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 29–30; see also 5 U.S.C. § 705 (courts may
only grant stays under section 705 to prevent irreparable injury).
However, because the Sierra Club v. Jackson court’s interpretation
is neither binding nor consistent with the plain language of section
705, EPA’s section 705 reasonable determination should be
reviewed under the appropriate “justice so requires” standard. See
S. Shrimp All. v. United States, 33 Ct. Int’l Trade 560, 572 (2009).
In light of the broad authority expressly delegated to the EPA
in section 705, the EPA reasonably determined that based on the
circumstances justice required staying the approaching
compliance deadlines. In the Temporary Stay Notice the EPA
explained that the administrative petitions for reconsideration
raises “sweeping and wide ranging” objections to the 2015 ELGs
Rule that overlap with issues in the litigation. 82 Fed. Reg. at
19,005. EPA emphasized that the petitions raised issues relating
to the feasibility and costs of the new limits. Id. EPA reasonably
determined that—in light of the “capital expenditures that
facilities incurring costs under the [2015 ELGs] Rule will need to
undertake” to meet the fast approaching compliance deadlines and
EPA’s reconsideration of the 2015 ELGs Rule—justice so requires
it to postpone the compliance dates of the rule that have not yet
passed. Id.; see also Effluent Limitations Guidelines and
Standards for the Steam Electric Power Generating Point Source
80 Fed. Reg. 67,838, 67,854 (Nov. 3, 2015) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
423) (2015 final ELGs rule).
2. The 2015 ELGs Rule is pending judicial review in the Fifth
Circuit.
Under section 705, an agency may only postpone an action
taken by it that is pending judicial review. 5 U.S.C. § 705.
Following EPA’s promulgation of the 2015 ELGs Rule, numerous
parties filed petitions for review of the rule, which were
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consolidated in the Fifth Circuit. Consolidation Order, Sw. Elec.
Power Co. v. EPA, No. 15–60821 (5th Cir. Dec. 9, 2015), Doc. No. 2.
Here, the EPA rightfully issued the Temporary Stay Notice
under section 705 because it stayed certain compliance deadlines
of the 2015 ELGs Rule that are “pending judicial review.” As the
EPA explained in the Temporary Stay Notice, the “sweeping and
wide-ranging objections” raised in the reconsideration petitions
overlap with issues in the Fifth Circuit litigation. 82 Fed. Reg. at
19,005. On April 12, 2017, when EPA announced it would
reconsider the 2015 ELGs Rule, it faced an impending May 4, 2017,
deadline to file its merits brief. Id. Thereafter, EPA moved to hold
the case pending in the Fifth Circuit in abeyance for 120 days and
the Fifth Circuit granted EPA’s motion. Abeyance Order, Sw. Elec.
Power Co. v. EPA, No. 15–60821(5th Cir. Apr. 24, 2017), Doc. No.
00513964356; see also 82 Fed. Reg. at 19,005–06. Thus, EPA
clearly articulated a link between the pending judicial review and
the stay of certain 2015 ELGs Rule compliance deadlines since the
pending judicial challenges underlie both the reconsideration and
the stay.
B. Section 705 Authorizes the Postponement of Future
Compliance Dates Because they are Within the
Meaning of the Term “Effective Date.”
Section 705 broadly authorizes EPA to postpone the “effective
date of action taken by it.” 135 U.S.C. § 705. The EPA reasonably
construed section 705 to permit it to stay specific compliance dates
that fall after the initial effective date of the 2015 ELGs Rule.
Specifically, EPA reasonably concluded that compliance dates that
have not passed are within the meaning of “effective date.” The
Supreme Court in United States v. Mead Corp., noted that agency
action, whatever its form, is due some deference given the
“specialized experience and broader investigations and
information” available to the agency. 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001)
(citing Skidmore v. Swift Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944)). Thus,
because EPA’s determination that compliance deadlines fit within
“effective date” involve the interplay of the APA, CWA, and the
2015 ELGs Rule, EPA is owed deference.
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The view that EPA is without authority to postpone certain
deadlines of the 2015 ELGs Rule because the January 4, 2016,
effective date has already passed relies on an overly restrictive
interpretation of “effective date.” Under section 705, EPA may stay
“the effective date of action taken by it.” 5 U.S.C. § 705. The term
“effective date” is not defined in the APA and therefore must be
viewed in context. The APA defines “agency action” broadly as “the
whole or a part” of any agency rule, order, license, or sanction,
relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or the failure to act,” Id.
§ 551(13); see also id. § 701(b)(2). Thus, it is reasonable to read
effective date to include multiple dates because an agency action
may have more than one part.
Here, the 2015 ELGs Rule established an effective date of
January 4, 2016, but the earliest compliance dates take effect
November 1, 2018. 80 Fed. Reg. at 67,838, 67,894–97; see 40 C.F.R.
§ 423.13(g)(1)(i), (h)(1)(i), (i)(1)(i), (k)(1)(i) (2017). EPA’s
interpretation gives full effect to the APA’s definition of “agency
action” and allows an agency to postpone part of a rule by
postponing certain future compliance dates. The EPA’s
interpretation also gives meaning to “justice so requires” as it
allows the EPA to narrowly tailor its postponement to only the
particular future compliance dates that may cause hardship.
Also, neither case law nor prior agency practice precludes the
EPA’s interpretation of including compliance dates within the
meaning of “effective date.” EPA has never interpreted section 705
to not authorize the agency to postpone compliance dates of a rule
whose effective date has already passed. Although a lower court
recently addressed this issue, the opinion is unpublished and the
facts are highly distinguishable. See Becerra v. U.S. Dep’t of
Interior, No. 17-cv-02376-EDL, 2017 WL 3891678, at *8–11 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 30, 2017).
The court in Becerra v. U.S. Department of Interior relied on
another unpublished decision, Safety-Kleen Corp. v. EPA, to hold
that the term “effective date” in section 705 did not encompass
“compliance dates.” Id. However, the lower court’s reliance on
Safety-Kleen Corp. was unjustified given that it does not address if
the meaning of “effective date” includes compliance dates that have
not yet passed. See Safety-Kleen Corp. v. EPA, No. 92-1629, 1996
U.S. App. LEXIS 2324, at *2–*3 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 19, 1996). Most
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importantly in Becerra the Department of the Interior tried to
postpone the entire rule based on the fact that some compliance
dates had not yet passed. Becerra, 2017 WL 3891678, at *8–9. In
our case, the EPA is not staying the entire 2015 ELGs Rule, but is
merely postponing certain compliance dates that have yet to
become effective. It was thus reasonable for the EPA to conclude
that because the compliance deadlines reflect the dates when
specific parts of the 2015 ELGs Rule take effect, they fit perfectly
within the meaning of “effective date.”
C. The EPA May Postpone the Compliance Dates of a
Rule Under APA Section 705 Without Notice and
Comment Rulemaking Because Section 705 Does Not
Require Notice and Comment and an Agency Issued
Stay is Not a “Rule.”
Section 705 is a free-standing grant of authority to provide
equitable relief pending judicial review that does not mention or
cross-reference the APA’s separate rulemaking provisions. The
APA has numerous cross-references, indicating that Congress
chose to intentionally include them when it so wanted to. See, e.g.,
5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012) (cross-referencing sections 556 and 557); 5
U.S.C. § 556(a) (2012) (cross-referencing sections 553 and 554); 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (cross-referencing sections 556 and 557). Courts
are reluctant to read additional requirements into a statutory
provision when there is no indication in the text or legislative
history that Congress intended to incorporate those terms. See,
e.g., Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2140 (2016)
(rejecting dissent’s interpretation of statute because “[i]t reads into
the provision a limitation . . . that the language nowhere
mentions”). The fact that Congress did not cross-reference section
553 shows that it did not intend for section 705 to require notice
and comment rulemaking.
Additionally, the EPA is not required to undertake notice and
comment rulemaking when issuing a section 705 stay of not yet
effective compliance deadlines because the stay is not a “rule”
within the meaning of APA section 553. Under the APA, a “rule” is
an “agency statement . . . designed to implement, interpret, or
prescribe law or policy.” 5 U.S.C. § 551(4). The Temporary Stay
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Notice does none of these things, and is therefore not a rule. A court
recently addressed this issue and held that a section 705 stay “does
not constitute a substantive rulemaking because, by definition, it
is not ‘designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or
policy[.]’” Sierra Club, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 28 (citations omitted).
Nor does the Temporary Stay Notice repeal or amend the 2015
ELGs Rule. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (“‘[R]ule making’ means agency
process for formulating, amending, or repealing a rule.”). The
Temporary Stay Notice has not altered the substance of the 2015
ELGs Rule.
Some courts have recognized that when an agency puts off
compliance indefinitely, such a suspension is “tantamount to a
revocation” and should be subject to the same notice and comment
requirements as a repeal under the APA. See Nat. Res. Def.
Council, Inc. v. EPA, 683 F.2d 752, 763 (3d Cir. 1982); Pub. Citizen
v. Steed, 733 F.2d 93, 98 (D.C. Cir. 1984). However, section 705
stays are temporary procedural tools employed by agencies to
preserve the status quo pending judicial review.
Lastly, interpreting section 705 to require notice and comment
defeats the policy behind section 705 since the upcoming deadlines
that the agency intends to postpone will likely have passed.
Clearly, an agency cannot undergo notice and comment
rulemaking within the limited time between a final rule’s
publication and initial effective date. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(d).
Therefore, the EPA did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in issuing
the Temporary Stay Notice postponing certain compliance
deadlines under the 2015 ELGs Rule.
In sum, because the Temporary Stay Notice postponing the
2015 ELGs Rule’s compliance deadlines for achieving zero
discharge of coal ash waters is a valid and reasonable exercise of
EPA’s authority under section 705, it has the effect of relieving
EnerProg from complying with the November 1, 2018, deadlines
for achieving zero discharge of fly ash and bottom ash transport
water. See 82 Fed. Reg. at 19,005; see infra Section III.
III.

EPA REGION XII’S RELIANCE ON BPJ FOR
REQUIRING ZERO DISCHARGE OF COAL ASH
TRANSPORT
WATERS
IS
UNJUSTIFIED
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BECAUSE AS A MATTER OF LAW THE 2015
ELGS RULE APPLIES.
CWA section 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2012), prohibits the
discharge of pollutants to “waters of the United States” unless
authorized by, among other things, an NPDES permit. EPA
implements the federal NPDES program by issuing permits that
allow for the discharge of pollutants subject to limitations. 33
U.S.C. § 1342 (2012). Here, EPA Region XII’s reliance on BPJ was
unjustified given that the 2015 ELGs Rule has the full force and
effect of law. This Court reviews EPA’s action under the arbitrary
and capricious standard. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
A. The CWA Does Not Require Case-by-Case BPJ
Limits Where a Final Nationwide ELG Applies.
The plain language of the CWA does not allow permitting
authorities to perform a BPJ analysis when applicable ELGs are
in place. Effluent limitations in NPDES permits may be either
technology-based (“TBELs”) or water quality-based. See 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1311(b), 1313, 1342. If the EPA has developed industrial
category-wide ELGs such limits must be included in that facility’s
permit. Id. § 1342; 40 C.F.R. § 125.3(c)(1) (2017). However, where
the EPA has not developed an ELG for a particular industry, or
has not addressed a particular pollutant discharged by an
industry, the CWA authorizes EPA to use its BPJ to develop permit
limits based on case-by-case analysis. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1)(B); 40
C.F.R. § 125.3(c)(2)–(c)(3). Thus, the imposition of BPJ is required
only “[i]f no national standards have been promulgated for a
particular category of point sources.” Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc. v. EPA, 859 F.2d 156, 199 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
Here, EPA Region XII was required to include in EnerProg’s
January 18, 2017, issued NPDES Permit only the 2015 ELGs
Rule’s limits, pursuant to section 402(a) of the CWA, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342, and 40 C.F.R. § 125.3(c)(1). The ELGs for the Steam
Electric Power Generating Point Source Category are codified in
40 C.F.R. § 423. On November 3, 2015, EPA properly promulgated
the final 2015 ELGs Rule entitled, “Effluent Limitations
Guidelines and Standards for the Steam Electric Power
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Generating Point Source Category,” thereby amending 40 C.F.R. §
423. See 80 Fed. Reg. at 67,839. The EPA determined in the 2015
ELGs Rule that power plants are able to meet a zero-discharge
standard for fly ash and bottom ash wastewaters based on the
available technology of dry handling of these wastes. See id. at
67,841. The 2015 ELGs Rule applies to EnerProg’s NPDES Permit
because the MEGS is a coal fired steam electric power plant with
one unit rated at a maximum dependable capacity of 745
megawatts. See 40 C.F.R. § 423.10. Thus, the 2015 ELGs Rule
applied to EnerProg’s MEGS wastewaters.
Moreover, although the 2015 ELGs Rule is currently being
challenged in the Fifth Circuit and EPA announced that it will
conduct a new rulemaking to revise portions of the 2015 ELGs
Rule, it is still a final rule because it has not been vacated or
remanded. See 82 Fed. Reg. at 19,005; Abeyance Order, Sw. Elec.
Power Co. v. EPA, No. 15–60821(5th Cir. Apr. 24, 2017), Doc. No.
00513964356. EPA has held that it must issue permits based on
effluent regulations promulgated in final form pursuant to CWA
sections 301 and 304, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1314, even when those
regulations are undergoing judicial review. See In re Inland Steel
Co., 1975 WL 23870, at *4 (E.P.A.G.C.); In re U.S. Steel Corp., 1975
WL 23847, at *1 (E.P.A.G.C.); In re U.S. Steel Corp., 1975 WL
23866, at *3 (E.P.A.G.C.); In re Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co.,
1975 WL 23875, at *1 (E.P.A.G.C.). The fact here remains that the
2015 ELGs Rule is a properly promulgated rule with the full force
and effect of law. See 80 Fed. Reg. at 67,839. Accordingly, as a
matter of law, the EPA should have issued EnerProg’s NPDES
Permit based on the current 2015 ELGs Rule.
B. EPA Region XII’s Unjustified Reliance on BPJ Has a
Negative Practical Effect on EnerProg’s NPDES
Permit Requirements.
Because the April 25, 2017, Temporary Stay Notice effectively
postpones the November 1, 2018, compliance deadlines for
achieving zero discharge limits of coal ash transport waters, it has
the effect of relieving EnerProg from complying with the November
1, 2018, deadlines for achieving zero discharge of fly ash and
bottom ash transport water. See 82 Fed. Reg. at 19,005. The EPA
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also announced a proposed rule to postpone the compliance date
for the more stringent BAT effluent limitations for fly ash and
bottom ash transport water which would thereby relieve EnerProg
from compliance. Postponement of Certain Compliance Dates for
the Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for the Steam
Electric Power Generating Point Source Category, 82 Fed. Reg.
26,017 (proposed June 6, 2017) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 423).
Also, the 2015 ELGs Rule is currently being challenged in the
Fifth Circuit so there is a possibility that it may be vacated or
modified. EPA’s policy for revision of issued NPDES permits
following a modification is as follows: only those permit conditions
and limitations based upon promulgated effluent guidelines which
were subsequently modified as the result of a court order or
remand may be revised pursuant to this policy. In re U.S. Steel
Corp., 1975 WL 23847, at *3. Here, if the 2015 ELGs Rule is
modified as the result of a court order, EnerProg will be unable to
request a revision of its NPDES Permit because the permit
requirements are based on BPJ and not the 2015 ELGs Rule.
Therefore, EPA Region XII’s reliance on BPJ to support the zero
discharge limits requirement for bottom ash and fly ash transport
waters negatively impacts the practical effect on EnerProg’s
NPDES Permit.
C. Even if the 2015 ELGs Rule Was Eliminated or
Vacated, Reliance on BPJ is Unjustified Because the
1982 ELGs Apply.
Where a current rule has been invalid, the prior agency rule
will control “until validly rescinded or replaced.” Cumberland Med.
Ctr. v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 781 F.2d 536, 538 (6th Cir.
1986). Thus, assuming the 2015 ELGs Rule was eliminated or
vacated, the 1982 ELGs control since it has the full force and effect
of law. Steam Electric Power Generating Point Source Category
Effluent Limitations Guidelines, Pretreatment Standards and
New Source Performance Standards, 47 Fed. Reg. 52,290 (Nov. 19,
1982) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 423) (1982 final rule).
1. The 1982 ELGs regulate arsenic, mercury, and selenium.
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Here too the plain language of the CWA state that EPA is not
to perform a BPJ analysis when applicable ELGs are in place. 33
U.S.C. § 1342. Only where EPA has not developed an ELG for a
particular industry, or has not addressed a particular pollutant
discharged by an industry, is the EPA authorized to use its BPJ to
develop permit limits based on case-by-case determinations. See 40
C.F.R. § 125.3(c)(2)–(c)(3).
Here, the 1982 ELGs regulate arsenic, mercury, and selenium
and therefore EPA Region XII should have applied the 1982 ELGs
as required by the CWA. There are only two published court
opinions directly addressing this issue and both held that the 1982
ELGs regulate arsenic, mercury, and selenium and therefore the
1982 ELGs applied. See Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Kentucky
Waterways All., 517 S.W.3d 479, 492 (Ky. 2017); Nat. Res. Def.
Council v. Pollution Control Bd., 37 N.E.3d 407, 413 (Ill. App. Ct.
2015). When developing the 1982 ELGs the EPA declined to impose
BAT based limits on thirty-four metals and toxins and explained
that they were “excluded . . . because they are present in amounts
too small to be effectively reduced by technologies known to the
Administrator.” 47 Fed. Reg. at 52,303–04. Both courts reasoned
that although the 1982 ELGs do not provide a TBEL for the thirtyfour toxic chemicals it lists— including mercury, arsenic, and
selenium—the lack of a TBEL for that pollutant does not mean
that the unregulated pollutant was unaddressed by or is outside
the scope of the 1982 ELGs. See 37 N.E.3d 407, 413; 517 S.W.3d
479, 488–89.
Additionally, both courts found support for their holding under
the NPDES Permit Writer’s Manual (“Permit Manual”). See
Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 517 S.W.3d at 489 (approving and
discussing Pollution Control Bd.); Pollution Control Bd., 37 N.E.3d
at 413–14. The Permit Manual states that case-by-case TBELs are
established only in situations where ELGs are inapplicable, such
as:
When [ELGs] are available for the industry category, but no effluent
guidelines requirements are available for the pollutant of concern . . . . The
permit writer should make sure that the pollutant of concern is not already
controlled by the effluent guidelines and was not considered by EPA when
the Agency developed the effluent guidelines.
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U.S. EPA, National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) Permit Writers’ Manual, § 5.2.3.2, at 5-45 to 5-46 (Sept.
2010). Thus, both courts concluded that because the EPA
considered and addressed arsenic, mercury, and selenium when
creating the 1982 ELGs, the permit writer was required “to refrain
from imposing [BPJ] limitations” and must instead apply the 1982
ELGs. See Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 517 S.W.3d at 489; Pollution
Control Bd., 37 N.E.3d at 414. Therefore, because arsenic,
mercury, and selenium are regulated under the 1982 ELGs, EPA
Region XII’s decision to set BPJ limits was arbitrary and
capricious.
2. Assuming BPJ is justified, EPA Region XII failed to
consider whether the BAT effluent limitation was
economically achievable.
The EPA does not have unlimited discretion to establish
permit effluent limitations when issuing permits on a case-by-case
basis using its BPJ. EPA Regions are required to consider the
factors enumerated in section 304 of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b).
See also 40 C.F.R. § 125.3(c)–(d). In addition, courts reviewing
permits issued on a BPJ basis hold EPA to the same technologybased standard and factors that must be considered in establishing
the national ELGs. See Trustees for Alaska v. EPA, 749 F.2d 549,
553 (9th Cir. 1984) (reasoning EPA must consider statutorily
enumerated factors in its BPJ determination of effluent
limitations). For existing sources, toxic pollutants are subject to
BAT. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(2), 1314(b)(2), 1317(a)(2). “[T]he
basic requirement for BAT effluent limitations is only that they be
technologically and economically achievable.” Am. Petroleum Inst.
v. EPA, 858 F.2d 261, 265– 66 (5th Cir. 1988). A technology is
“available” even if it is used only by the best facility in the industry.
See Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 870 F.2d 177, 226 (5th Cir. 1989). A
technology is economically achievable if the costs can be reasonably
borne by the industry as a whole. See Waterkeeper All., Inc. v. EPA,
399 F.3d 486, 516 (2d Cir. 2005); Rybachek v. EPA, 904 F.2d 1276,
1290-91 (9th Cir. 1990).
Arsenic, mercury, and selenium are toxic pollutants and thus,
assuming BPJ reliance is justified, EPA Region XII was required
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to determine what effluent limitations represent BAT level using
its BPJ by considering all the factors. See 40 C.F.R. § 125.3(c)-(d).
Here, EPA Region XII determined, in its BPJ, that zero discharge
of coal ash handling wastes by November 1, 2018, constitutes BAT
for discharges associated with fly ash and bottom ash transport
wastes. The EPA properly determined that the BAT effluent
limitation was technologically achievable because dry handling of
bottom ash and fly ash has been in use at existing industry plants.
However, the EPA wrongly determined that the BAT effluent
limitation was economically achievable because it failed to consider
if the costs can be reasonably borne by the industry as a whole. The
EPA only determined that the MEGS is sufficiently profitable to
adopt dry handling of bottom ash and fly ash because it “would cost
no more than twelve cents per month increase in the average
consumer’s electric bill.” EPA should have considered what the
costs would be to the industry as a whole, not what the cost
increase would be to the consumer.
Although Congress intended BAT to be technology-forcing an
agency determination is rejected as arbitrary and capricious if it
fails to consider appropriate factors. See St. Elizabeth Cmty. Hosp.
v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1984). Therefore, because EPA
Region XII acted arbitrary and capricious in determining that zero
discharge of fly ash and bottom ash transport wastes by November
1, 2018, constituted BAT for discharges associated with waste, this
Court should reject EPA’s Region XII’s determination.
IV.

OUTFALL 008 IS NOT A DISCHARGE SUBJECT
TO NPDES PERMITTING REQUIREMENTS
BECAUSE THE MEGS POND IS NOT A WATER
OF THE UNITED STATES AND IS OUTSIDE THE
JURISDICTIONAL REACH OF THE CWA.

The CWA prohibits the discharge of any pollutant from a point
source into “waters of the United States,” unless authorized by,
among other things, an NPDES permit. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).
Congress explicitly limited the jurisdiction of the CWA to “waters
of the United States.” Id. § 1362(7) (2012); Rapanos v. United
States, 547 U.S. 715, 756 (2006). Importantly, the CWA does not
apply to all waters within the United States, and certain bodies of
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water have been specifically excluded from the CWA’s
jurisdictional reach. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (defining “waters of the
United States”); see also Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S.
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (holding that CWA
jurisdiction does not apply to isolated ponds that are not adjacent
to open water). These excluded bodies of water are not subject to
the requirements of the CWA, including the NPDES permitting
requirements. 33 U.S.C. § 1342.
EPA Region XII and the EAB properly determined that the
MEGS Pond is not a “water of the United States” as defined in 40
C.F.R. § 122.2, specifically under the exclusion for “waste
treatment systems” and incorporation of Note 1. Accordingly,
discharges from internal Outfalls 008 and 009 into the MEGS Pond
are not subject to the NDPES permitting requirements. Once
again, this Court reviews EPA’s action under the extremely
deferential arbitrary and capricious standard. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
A. The Internal Discharges into the MEGS Pond are
Exempted from NPDES Requirements Because the
MEGS Pond is a Waste Treatment Pond and Not a
Water of the United States.
The MEGS Pond is outside the jurisdictional reach of the CWA
and exempt from NPDES permitting requirements because it is
excluded from EPA’s definition for “waters of the United States.”
The MEGS Pond is a “waste treatment system . . . designed to meet
the requirements of the CWA” and is therefore not a water of the
United States. 40 C.F.R. § 122.2. This exclusion applies even
though the MEGS Pond was originally created by impounding a
water of the United States because the EPA properly suspended
the sentence which limited the exclusion by including Note 1 in 40
C.F.R. § 122.2.
1. The EPA has authority to define “waters of the United
States” for purposes of administering the CWA.
An administrative agency has the authority to form policy and
promulgate rules “to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by
Congress” when administering a congressionally created program.
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Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974). “Such legislative
regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary to statute.” Chevron, U.S.A. Inc.,
467 U.S. at 844.
Congress drafted the CWA to prohibit the discharge of any
pollutant from a point source into “navigable waters.” 33 U.S.C.
1311(a). “Navigable waters,” is statutorily defined as the “waters
of the United States.” Id. § 1362(7); Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 730–31.
For purposes of administering the CWA and issuing permits,
including NPDES permits, EPA promulgated a regulatory
definition defining the scope of “waters of the United States.” See
33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1); 40 C.F.R. § 122.1. The regulatory definition
for waters of the United States includes, among other things, “all
impoundments of waters otherwise identified as waters of the
United States.” 40 C.F.R.§ 122.2(a)(4). However, the regulatory
definition for “waters of the United States” also explicitly excludes
“waste treatment systems, including ponds . . ., designed to meet
the requirements of the [CWA].” Id. §122.2(b)(1).
2. The MEGS Pond is excluded from the regulatory definition
of waters of the United States because it is a “waste
treatment system . . . designed to meet the requirements of
the [CWA].”
EnerProg does not contest that Fossil Creek and the MEGS
Pond fall within the scope of EPA’s definition for “waters of the
United States” pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 122.2. Fossil Creek is a
perennial tributary of a navigable in-fact interstate body of water,
the Progress River, and is a “water of the United States” within the
jurisdictional reach of the CWA. 40 C.F.R. § 122.2(a)(2), (a)(5). The
MEGS Pond is an impoundment of Fossil Creek, a water of the
United States, and thereby fits within the definition of a “water of
the United States” for impoundments. Id. § 122.2(a)(4). However,
the MEGS Pond qualifies as “a waste treatment system, including
treatment ponds . . . designed to meet the requirements of the
CWA.” 40 C.F.R. § 122.2(b)(1).
EnerProg acknowledges that the waste treatment system
exclusion was initially limited to “only manmade bodies of water
which neither were originally created in waters of the United

25

130 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol. 9

States nor resulted from the impoundment of waters of the United
States.” 40 C.F.R. § 122.2(b)(1); Hazardous Waste and
Consolidated Permit Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg. 33,066, 33,424
(May 19, 1980). However, following the adoption of the regulation,
regulated parties in the industry filed petitions for review which
prompted the EPA to suspend and re-examine the provision.
Consolidated Permit Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg. 48,620 (July 21,
1980) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 122.2, Note 1). Specifically, EPA
suspended the qualifying sentence of the exclusion, amending 40
C.F.R. § 122.2 to include Note 1 which states: “[i]n 40 C.F.R.
§ [122.2], in the definition of ‘Waters of the United States,’ the last
sentence, beginning ‘This exclusion applies. . .,’ is suspended until
further notice.” Id. Note 1 effectively suspends the qualification to
the exclusion, providing that all “waste treatment systems,
including treatment ponds . . . designed to meet the requirements
of the [CWA]” are not waters of the United States. 40 C.F.R.
§ 122.2(b)(1).
3. The EPA intended for the waste treatment system exclusion
to supersede the classification of a water as an
impoundment.
The classification of the MEGS Pond as a “waste treatment
system” supersedes its classification as “an impoundment” of a
water of the United States. Subsection (b) of the EPA’s regulatory
definition for “waters of the United States” exempts specific water
bodies and water features, “even where they otherwise meet the
terms of [an impoundment of waters of the United States].” 40
C.F.R. § 122.2(b).
EPA’s interpretation of the exclusion and the Note 1
suspension are “the ultimate criterion” when determining the
meaning of an agency’s regulation “unless it is plainly erroneous
or inconsistent.” Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S.
410, 414 (1945). The court “must give substantial deference to an
agency’s interpretation of its own regulations.” Thomas Jefferson
Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994). “Unless an alternative
reading is compelled by the regulation’s plain language or by other
indications of the [Administrator’s] intent at the time of the
regulation’s promulgation,” the court must defer to the EPA’s
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interpretation. Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415, 430 (1988).
Such deference is warranted when the regulation concerns “a
complex and highly technical regulatory program.” Thomas
Jefferson, 512 U.S. at 512 (citing Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc.,
501 U.S. 680, 697 (1991)).
Here, EPA clearly interprets the waste water treatment
exclusion to apply even if the “treatment pond” is an
“impoundment.” As discussed above, the EPA intentionally
suspended the limiting language of the waste water exclusion
because it created too many problems with pre-existing waste
treatment systems. The subsequent publications and amendments
of EPA’s regulatory definitions manifest the EPA’s intent to
exclude impoundments like the MEGS Pond when the
impoundment qualifies for the exclusion under 40 C.F.R.
§ 122.2(b).
The Clean Water Rule: Definition of Waters of the United
States, 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054 (June 29, 2015) (codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 122.2) (“Final Rule”) is the most recent publication of 40 C.F.R.
§ 122.2. The Final Rule expressly states: “[w]aters and features
that are excluded under paragraph (b) of the rule cannot be
determined to be jurisdictional under any of the categories in the
rule under paragraph (a).” 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,073. Additionally,
EPA specifically states: “[i]mportantly, under the rule all waters
and features identified in paragraph as excluded will not be
“Waters of the United States” even if they otherwise fall within one
of the categories in paragraphs (a)(4) through (a)(8).” Id. at 37,096.
(emphasis added). Paragraph (a)(4) identifies “all impoundments
of waters of the United States as falling within the jurisdiction of
the CWA. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.2(a)(4).
Additionally, Note 1 has been included in all subsequent
publications of 40 C.F.R. § 122.2, specifically the: 1983
Amendments to section 122.2 (Environmental Permit Regulations:
RCRA Hazardous Waste; SDWA Underground Injection Control);
the CWA National Pollution Discharge Elimination System; CWA
section 404 Dredge or Fill Programs; and CAA Prevention of
Significant Deterioration, 48 Fed. Reg. 14,146 (Apr. 1, 1983)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 122.2), and the recent amendments to
“waters of the United States” in 2015, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,054. The
EPA’s consistent and longstanding practice to include Note 1,
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suspending the qualification limiting the waste treatment system
exclusion, in all subsequent publications of 40 C.F.R. § 122.2
further demonstrates EPA’s intent to exclude waste treatment
systems even when the pond is created from an impoundment of a
water of the United States.
Furthermore, there is no evidence that EPA included this
explanation as a post-hoc rationalization just for “the purpose of
litigation.” Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212
(1988). Rather, the explanation makes it clear that the EPA
purposely intended to exclude impoundments specifically designed
to be a waste treatment system, like the MEGS Pond, from the
jurisdictional reach of the CWA.
B. EPA’s Suspension of the Limitation on the Waste
Treatment Exclusion is Effective Because the EPA
Adhered to the Requirements for Administrative
Rulemaking Pursuant to Section 553 of the CWA.
Petitioner FCW claims that the suspension of the last sentence
of paragraph (b)(1) of 40 C.F.R. § 122.2, Note 1, originally
published in 45 Fed. Reg. 48,620, and retained in the most recent
amendment to the code section is invalid because it does not
comply with the statutory requirements of section 553 of the APA.
See 45 Fed. Reg. at 48,620. Section 553 establishes “the maximum
procedural requirements which Congress was willing to have
courts impose upon agencies in conducting rulemaking
procedures.” Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., 435 U.S. at 524.
Section 553 expressly requires a federal agency to provide
public notice and an opportunity to comment whenever an agency
proposes, amends, or repeals a rule. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c). It also
provides that “[g]eneral notice of the proposed rulemaking shall be
published in the Federal Register.” Id. § 553(b). The notice
requirements are intended to “assure fairness and mature
consideration of rules.” NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759,
763 (1969). “Section 553(b) does not require that interested parties
be provided precise notice of each aspect of the regulations
eventually adopted. Rather, notice is sufficient if it affords
interested parties a reasonable opportunity to participate in the
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rulemaking process.” Forester v. Consumer Product Safety
Comm’n., 559 F.2d 774, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
Petitioner FCW’s claim is not supported as evidenced by EPA’s
actions. Note 1 was promptly published in the Federal Register
when the suspension was first issued by EPA in 1980. See 45 Fed.
Reg. at 48,620. Since the initial publication, the EPA included the
suspension in two amendments to 40 C.F.R. § 122.2, the 1983
Amendments to section 122.2, 48 Fed. Reg. at 14,146, and the 2014
proposed rulemaking to amend section 122.2, Definition of “Waters
of the United States” Under Clean Water Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 22,187
(proposed Apr. 21, 2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 122.2). In
both rulemakings, EPA followed the notice and comment
requirements of section 553 by including the notice of the proposed
amendments in the Federal Registrar and allowing interested
parties the opportunity to comment on the potential impacts of the
proposed amendments to the rule. The suspension is therefore
compliant with section 553 of the APA and effectively excludes the
MEGS Pond from CWA jurisdiction.
C. Alternatively, the EPA’s Suspension of the
Limitation on the Waste Treatment Exclusion is a
Policy Judgment Not Subject to the Requirements of
APA Section 553.
On the other hand, if this court finds that the EPA did not
adhere to the requirements of APA section 553, this court should
dismiss FCW’s claims because the inclusion of Note 1 and
suspension of the limiting language of the “waste treatment
system” exclusion is not a rulemaking as defined by the APA.
Rather, the inclusion of Note 1 and suspension of the limiting
language of “waste treatment system” constitutes a policy
judgment by the EPA Administrator. Statements of policy are
specifically excluded from the 553 requirements. 5 U.S.C.
§ 553(b)(3)(A).
While section 553 generally requires notice and an opportunity
to comment for an agency’s proposed rulemaking, it also contains
an exemption for “interpretative rules, general statements of
policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice.” Id.
“Policy statements are exempt from the APA’s notice-and-comment

29

134 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol. 9

requirements, and thus may take effect without the rigors and
presumed advantages of that process.” Bechtel v. F.C.C., 10 F.3d
875, 878 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
A rule is a policy statement if the statement “merely guide[s]
future exercise of agency discretion by advising agency officials,
staff, and the public in a manner in which the agency intends to
exercise a discretionary power.” Brown Express, Inc. v. United
States, 607 F.2d 695, 701 (5th Cir. 1979). If the policy statement
leaves “agency decision-makers free to exercise discretion” then the
policy statement is distinguishable from a substantive rule. Am.
Bus Ass’n. v. United States, 627 F.2d 525, 529 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
Additionally, a policy statement “is one that does not impose any
rights and obligations on [a regulated party].” Texaco, Inc. v. Fed.
Power Comm’n., 412 F.2d 740, 744 (3d. Cir. 1969).
Here, the EPA’s suspension of the qualifying limitation to the
“waste treatment system” exclusion found in Note 1 fits the
description of a policy statement. The suspension still allows for
discretion to determine whether a water body qualifies as a waste
treatment system. In fact, the suspension actually expands EPA’s
discretion by removing the limitation because the suspension
permits EPA to determine whether any impoundment qualifies for
the waste treatment system exclusion, rather than just
impoundments that are “man-made.”
Moreover, the suspension does not create an obligation or right
to a regulated party. Suspending the limitation on the waste
treatment exclusion does not provide EnerProg an exclusion by
right. Whether EnerProg’s internal discharges into the MEGS
Pond are excluded from the NPDES permitting requirements is
still a decision left to EPA’s discretion.
V.

THE CLOSURE AND CAPPING OF THE MEGS
POND DOES NOT REQUIRE A DREDGE AND
FILL PERMIT PURSUANT TO SECTION 404 OF
THE CWA BECAUSE THE MEGS POND DOES
NOT INVOLVE A “WATER OF THE UNITED
STATES.”

The Clean Water Act prohibits the discharge of any pollutant,
including dirt, rock, clay and other materials into the “waters of
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the United States, except as authorized by section 404, 33 U.S.C
§ 1344. See 31 U.S.C. § 1311(a), The Secretary of the Army is
charged with issuing permits for “the discharge of dredged or fill
material” into the jurisdictional waters of the United States at
“specified disposal sites.” Id. § 1344(a), (d).
FCW asserts that dewatering and capping of the MEGS Pond
requires a fill permit pursuant to section 404 of the CWA. However,
because the MEGS Pond is not a “water of the United States,” any
discharge of fill material into the MEGS pond is not subject to the
section 404-permitting scheme. Accordingly, section 404 of the
CWA does not apply to the closure and capping of the MEGS Pond.
A. The MEGS Pond is not a “Water of the United States”
Under the Regulatory Definitions Implemented by
the EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers.
A water body must be within the jurisdictional reach of the
CWA for its statutory requirements to apply. For section 404 of the
CWA, jurisdiction is satisfied if the discharge of dredged or fill
materials is discharged into “navigable waters.” 33 U.S.C.
§ 1344(a); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty, 531 U.S. at 162.
“Navigable waters” is defined under the CWA as “the waters of the
United States, including the territorial seas.” 33 U.S.C. §§ 1344(a),
1362(7).
“The statutory term ‘waters of the United States’ is sufficiently
ambiguous to constitute an implied delegation of authority to the
Corps.” United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698, (4th Cir. 2003).
However, both EPA and the Corps of Engineers have developed
nearly identical regulatory definitions of “waters of the United
States” for purposes of implementing permits. Both regulatory
definitions for “waters of the United States” include
“impoundments” of jurisdictional waters, such as the MEGS Pond.
Compare 40 C.F.R. § 232.2 (EPA’s definition for “waters of the
United States”), with 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(4) (2017) (Corps of
Engineers definition of “waters of the United States”).
Both agencies also have identical exclusions for “waste
treatment systems” that define waste treatment systems as “not
waters of the United States.” Compare 40 C.F.R. § 232.2 (EPA’s
definition states “waste treatment systems, including treatment

31

136 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol. 9

ponds . . . designed to meet the requirements of the Act . . . are not
waters of the United States.”), with 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b)(1) (Corps
of Engineers definition states “waste treatment systems, including
treatment ponds . . . designed to meet the requirements of the
[CWA].”). Most importantly, both EPA and the Army Corps share
the view that a designation as a “waste treatment system”
supersedes a designation as an “impoundment.” Compare 40
C.F.R. § 232.2 (EPA notes “[Waste treatment systems] are not
“waters of the United States” even where they otherwise meet the
terms of [an impoundment] of this definition.”), with 33 C.F.R.
§ 328.3(b) (Corps of Engineers note “[Waste treatment systems]
are not ‘waters of the United States’ even where they otherwise
meet the terms of [an impoundment].”).
As previously stated, EnerProg does not contest that the
MEGS Pond is an impoundment of Fossil Creek, a water of the
United States. However, the MEGS Pond is a waste treatment
system designed to meet the requirements of the CWA. The MEGS
Pond sole function is to collect ash transport water for
sedimentation treatment in order to meet the effluent limitations
placed on Outfall 002, which directly discharges into the Moutard
Reservoir. Therefore, the Corps of Engineers and EPA properly
used their discretion to determine that the MEGS Pond is a waste
treatment system designed to meet the requirements of the CWA
and properly excluded it from section 404 requirements.
B. EPA is Not the Proper Authority to Issue a Section
404 Fill Permit.
Even if a fill permit is required, the Army Corps of
Engineers—not the EPA—possesses the authority to issue section
404 fill permits under the CWA. Section 404 assigns “the Secretary
of the Army, acting through the Chief of Engineers” the
responsibility of administering and issuing permits for the
discharge of fill materials. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a), (d). Additionally,
section 402 “prohibits the EPA from exercising permitting
authority that is provided [to the Corps] in section 404.” Couer
Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261, 273
(2009). Both EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers share the view
that section 402 “prohibits the EPA from issuing permits for
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discharges that are regulated under section 404.” Id. at 274; see
also 40 C.F.R. § 122.3(b); Water Pollution Control Memorandum of
Agreement on Solid Waste, 51 Fed. Reg. 8,871 (March 14, 1986)
(Memorandum of Agreement between EPA and the Corps to
address the applicability and overlap of 402 and 404 permit
programs). Once again, the agencies’ interpretation should be
granted deference unless it is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent
with the regulation.” Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).
In Couer Alaska, the Supreme Court affirmed the EPA and the
Corps of Engineers interpretation of the section 402 and 404
interplay. 557 U.S. at 272–76. The Supreme Court found that
EPA’s authority over section 404 permits is limited to providing
“guidelines” and the “power to veto a permit.” Id. at 274. The Court
found that the EPA’s authority to issue “guidelines” permitted the
EPA to write rules to help determine “whether to permit a
discharge or a fill.” Id. However, “those guidelines do not strip the
Corps of Engineers of power to issue permits for fill cases.” Id. at
276. Under the “veto” power, the EPA may object to a disposal site
if use of the defined area causes “an unacceptable adverse effect on
municipal water supplies, shellfish beds and fishery areas . . . ,
wildlife, or recreational areas.” Id.; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c).
Regardless which role the EPA takes, the Supreme Court in Couer
Alaska made it clear “[i]f the Corps has authority to issue a permit,
then the EPA may not do so.” Id. at 275.
In the matter at hand, should EnerProg require a section 404
permit for the closure and capping of the MEGS Pond, the Army
Corps is the appropriate agency to issue the permit. As discussed
supra, if the EPA chooses to exercise its authority regarding the
closure and capping of the MEGS Pond, it may do so by
conditioning the dewatering of the MEGS Pond via the NPDES
Permit for Outfall 002. However, the EPA is limited to its advisory
role and veto power when the discharge of fill material is subject
to the Corps authority under section 404.
Since the EPA did not raised any issues with the disposal site
and/or recognized any potential impacts the closure and capping of
the MEGS Pond may have to municipal water supplies, shellfish
beds, fisheries, wildlife, or recreation, the EPA’s involvement is
limited to providing guidance to the Army Corps of Engineers to
ensure compliance with the CWA. The EPA has done so by
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promulgating the regulations and guidelines found in Parts 230-32
of Title 40 in the Code of Federal Regulation. See 40 C.F.R. § 230.1
(2017) (“Congress has expressed a number of policies in the [CWA].
These Guidelines are intended to be consistent with and to
implement those policies.”). However, the EPA is not the proper
authority to determine whether the dewatering and capping of the
MEGS pond requires a fill permit pursuant to section 404 of the
CWA as such discretion belongs to the Army Corps of Engineers.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, EnerProg respectfully requests
that this Court remand NPDES permit PG000123 to EPA Region
XII for further consideration and additionally find that: (1)
inclusion of State of Progress’ conditions requiring coal ash pond
closure and capping were improper because they don’t comply with
section 401(d); (2) the April 25, 2017 Temporary Stay Notice
effectively postpones the 2015 ELGs Rule’s November 1, 2018,
compliance deadlines for achieving zero discharge coal ash
transport waters, thereby also postponing EnerProg’s NPDES
permit deadlines; (3) EPA Region XII could not rely on BPJ limits
as a ground for requiring zero discharge of coal ash transport
waters; (4) EPA Region XII properly excluded Internal Outfall 008
from NPDES permitting requirements; and (5) EPA Region XII
properly determined that the coal ash pond closure and capping
plan does not require a permit under section 404 of the CWA.
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